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I. Introduction
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), originally adopted as
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), guarantees that each
student in a special education program receives Free Appropriate Public Education
(FAPE).1 To comply with IDEA, the Wyoming Department of Education (WDE)
must submit a State Performance Plan (SPP) to the U.S. Department of Education
every six years.2 After the WDE submits an initial SPP, the WDE must also submit
an Annual Performance Report (APR) every subsequent year.3 According to the
WDE, SPPs are not “merely a vehicle for reporting” but a tool “to move the state
from its current level of compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements of
the law and to improve the education and functional outcomes for children with
disabilities.”4 In particular, the WDE measures state performance in providing

* University of Wyoming College of Law, J.D., 2017; University of Wyoming Department
of History, M.A., 2014.
1

See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a), (c)(2), (c)(3) (2015).

Wyoming Department of Education, Wyoming State Performance Plan for Special
Education, FFY 2005-2012 1 (2014), http://edu.wyoming.gov/downloads/special-ed/SpecEd_
SPP_FFY2005-2012_Rev_Submitted_to_OSEP_2-1-12.pdf [hereinafter WDE].
2

3

WDE, supra note 2.

4

WDE, supra note 2.
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FAPE to children with disabilities by analyzing and collecting data on specified
indicators.5 The WDE and the Department of Education believe these indicators
show whether special education students are receiving FAPE.6 Indicators include:
the number of youth with Individual Education Programs (IEP) who graduate
from high school with a regular diploma, dropout rates, performance of children
with disabilities on statewide assessments, suspension rates for children with
IEPs, the percent of children with disabilities in regular classrooms and/or special
education classrooms, children who have shown improvements in different areas
of school and social life, and the percent of parents who indicate the school
facilitated parent involvement.7
Under each of the indicators, the WDE records statewide improvements
over the subsequent years.8 Although data collected from the indicators shows
improvement of FAPE, a disconnect remains between the data and the reality of
the classroom.9 This disconnect is in part due to judicial interpretation creating
a low standard of FAPE.10 A majority of courts continue to implement an
interpretation of FAPE that only requires students to receive some educational
benefit.11 Even courts that have adopted a slightly higher standard of FAPE, have
failed to detail how this higher standard is different from the lower standard.12
Consequently, there is little difference between the two standards because the
courts only impose minimal standards on schools, special education students
continue to receive subpar education in comparison to students in the regular

5

WDE, supra note 2.

6

WDE, supra note 2.

7

See WDE, supra note 2.

8

See generally WDE, supra note 2.

See Wyoming Department of Education, Complaint Decision and Order for Corrective
Action C-0122-11 (May 12, 2011), http://edu.wyoming.gov/downloads/special-ed//SpecEd_
Complaint_C-0122-11_Redacted_Decision.pdf [hereinafter Decision C-0122-11]; Wyoming
Department of Education, Complaint Decision and Order for Corrective Action C-0140-11 (Sept.
17, 2011), http://edu.wyoming.gov/downloads/special-ed//SpecEd_Complaint_C-0140-11_
Redacted_Decision.pdf [hereinafter Decision C-0140-11]; Martin A. Kotler, Distrust and Disclosure
in Special Education Law, 119 Penn St. L. Rev. 485, 488 (2014) (on the national level there was an
emergence of two competing theories of IDEA— a rights theory that acknowledged the disabled
person’s dignity and a utilitarian theory that favored cost effective considerations—and judicial
interpretation implemented short-term cost considerations and the result was a unintended gap
between the parents’ expectations and the school’s expectations).
9

10

See infra Part II.

11

See infra Part II.C.

12

See infra Part II.C.
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classrooms.13 This low standard of FAPE additionally breeds a hostile schism
between parents’ expectations and the goals of the school district.14
Take, for example, the story of L.J. As a student in Wyoming’s special education
program, L.J. directly encountered the consequences of the low FAPE standard.15
L.J.’s parents quickly became dismayed with the general sense of complacency
the school exhibited towards L.J.’s educational progress.16 Repeatedly, L.J.’s
parents discussed their concerns and provided suggestions on how to change
L.J.’s curriculum to better reflect her individual learning needs.17 Specifically,
the special education teachers consistently assigned work to the class as a whole
and often completed assignments for L.J.18 Frustrated, L.J.’s parents did not feel
as if the school was challenging their child.19 After L.J.’s parents presented their
concerns, the school cited L.J.’s Individual Education Program (IEP) to deny
their requests.20 The school referenced how L.J. demonstrated some measurable
progress indicating that L.J.’s education plan was sufficient.21 Although L.J.’s IEP
suggested that she could perform certain skills, L.J. could not perform these skills
outside the classroom.22 L.J.’s parents thus felt trapped in a vicious cycle.23 They
would bring their concerns to the school and the school would cite L.J.’s IEP as an
indication that L.J. had made some measurable progress, which would effectively
end the discussion.24 Alternatively, if the school and L.J.’s parents did reach an

13
See Mindy LaBrosse, A FAPE Revolution: Reforming the FAPE Standard under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Rowley, Deaf Education, and No Child Left Behind, 12
Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 87, 106 (2013) (despite Congress’s 1997 and 2004 amendments
to IDEA and the passage of NCLB, the courts continue to apply the Rowley standard and
consequently disabled students do not receive adequate education); see also infra notes 166–78 and
accompanying text.
14
Kotler, supra note 9, at 498 (“The Court’s decision [in Rowley] resulted not only in limiting
the substantive educational goals of the Act, but also created a schism between parents of disabled
children and the educational establishment.”).
15
Telephone Interview with K.M., parent of L.J. (Aug. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Interview]. This
interview illustrates the struggles a parent and a disabled child encounter in the special education
system. The judicial interpretations of FAPE not only creates the standard for schools, but directly
impacts students and families. Thus, students and their parents serve as the intersection between
judicial interpretation and the classroom reality.
16

Interview, supra note 15.

17

Interview, supra note 15.

18

Interview, supra note 15.

19

Interview, supra note 15.

Interview, supra note 15. IDEA requires schools to create a written IEP for each student.
The IEP provides the child’s academic and functional goals, and measures the child’s progress
towards those goals. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2015).
20

21

Interview, supra note 15.

22

Interview, supra note 15.

23

Interview, supra note 15.

24

Interview, supra note 15.
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agreement about new techniques for L.J., the school would often not follow
through with the plans.25 The school’s inactions had negative effects on both L.J.
and her parents.26
Unfortunately, this story is all too familiar for families in Wyoming that have
children in the special education program.27 Many parents and children enter into
the special education program with the belief that the school will maximize the
potential of their child.28 However, the schools only have to provide services to the
extent required by law.29 Unfortunately, this means that the relationship between
the parents and the school disintegrates.30
In response to the schism between the school and parent, this comment argues
that the judicial interpretation of FAPE, which primarily promotes access over
progress, is insufficient for Wyoming parents and special education students.31
This comment further argues that Wyoming should amend Wyoming Statute
section 21-2-501 to impose a standard of FAPE that is more in line with the 1997
and 2004 amendments and the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).32 First, the
comment will provide a brief history of special education and the path that led to
the creation of IDEA.33 In particular, this comment will show how the discourse
surrounding the creation of IDEA continues to influence courts’ interpretations
of FAPE.34 The first section will also detail the amendments to IDEA, as well
as discuss the standard of education found in the regular classroom by looking
to NCLB.35 Next, this comment will argue that despite legislation by Congress
25
Interview, supra note 15. At one point, L.J.’s parents began taking L.J.to the Children’s
Hospital in Denver. The doctors provided L.J.’s parents suggestions on how to improve L.J.’s learning
and physical limitations. Although L.J.’s parents informed the school of the doctors’ suggestions, the
school dismissed the suggestions because they were “unfeasible.”
26

Interview, supra note 15.

27

See, e.g., Decision C-0122-11, supra note 9; Decision C-0140-11, supra note 9.

Kotler, supra note 9, at 500–01 (“At least upon their initial entry into the world of special
education, too many parents believe the school shares their goal of maximizing the potential for their
child and too many school districts, for whatever reason—differing expectations, fiscal constraints,
fungibility of children and, as an institution, not having to deal with the long term consequences of
their decisions—seek to provide the bare minimum allowed by law.”).
28

Scott F. Johnson, Rowley Forever More? A Call for Clarity and Change, 41 J.L. & Educ. 25,
26 (2012).
29

See Kotler, supra note 9, at 489 (“In any event, when parents learn, or come to believe that
schools are not offering programming designed to meet their expectations, and educators seek to
justify their actions by pointing to technical legal requirements, the predictable response is anger
and suspicion by the parents and defensiveness by the schools.”).
30

31

See infra Part III.

32

See infra Part III; see generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-501 (1997).

33

See infra Part II.A.

34

See infra Part II.A.

35

See infra Part II.A.
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seemingly imposing a higher standard, the majority of courts continue to apply
a lower standard of FAPE.36 Third, this comment will focus on the minority
interpretation of FAPE recognized in Wyoming.37 Finally, this comment argues
that there is little difference between the two interpretations of FAPE; however,
Congress’s amendments to IDEA and the creation of NCLB suggest a standard of
FAPE that emphasizes the success of special education students.38 Thus, Wyoming
should follow in the footsteps of a minority of states that have adopted statutes
providing a higher standard.39

II. Background
A. Developing the Idea of “Appropriate” Education and Education for
All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)
Entering into the twentieth century, American society experienced drastic
changes as a result of the influx of immigrants and the urbanization of society
as part of the industrial revolution.40 In response to the changing landscape,
American society entertained fears of a degenerating society and a national body.41
Progressives reacted to these changes by looking to the state to remedy social
imbalances and to achieve the common good.42 State run mental institutions and
their associated separate schools for “feebleminded” children became the tools
to address these social ills.43 However, with the rise of eugenics and increased
admissions, these schools shifted their focus from creating productive individuals
to having an asylum only concerned with custodial care of those society deemed

36

See infra Part II.B; see also infra Part II.C.

37

See infra Part II.D.

38

See infra Part II.D.

39

See infra Part III.

See Kim E. Nielsen, A Disability History of the United States 98, 100 (2013) (“The
solidification of the federal government that developed in this period, along with emerging
technologies and urbanization, aided the creation of institutions and the development of policies
pertaining to people considered disabled.” “The mass immigration of southern and eastern
Europeans who provided the cheap labor that fueled the nation’s industrial and economic expansion
now generated fears about a deteriorating national body . . . .”).
40

41
Nielsen, supra note 40, at 100. According to Progressives, violence, sexual deviancy,
poverty, and other social ills that plagued urban cities were evidence that American society was on
the decline. See Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform 212 (1960).
42
See David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternative
Progressive America 49 (1908) (“As [Progressives] saw it, the state would have to exercise its
authority to correct imbalances, to bring about equality, to realize the common good.”).

in

43

See James W. Trent Jr., Inventing

the

Feeble Mind: A History

of

Mental Retarda-

tion in the United States 26 (1995) (“The goal of education was productivity, and superintendents

assumed that educated idiots, freed from inactivity and no longer a burden to their family, would
return home to be productive and upright citizens in their communities.”).
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“disabled.”44 Until deinstitutionalization in the 1970s, the mental institutions
and schools physically excluded society’s “undesirable” members from the general
populace.45 As such, isolated schools and institutions characterized the treatment
of disabled adults and children for the majority of the twentieth century.46
However, in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement, parents of children who
were in these state schools advocated for deinstitutionalization.47 Parents were
not alone in their desire for deinstitutionalization because society also began to
negatively view the institutions.48 Advocates for children with disabilities relied on
the 1954 United States Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board of Education to
argue for equal education opportunities for the disabled in the lower courts.49
In 1972, two influential district court cases applied Brown’s equal protection
analysis and due process theory.50 In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Chil
dren (PARC) v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, thirteen parents and the PARC
brought a class action suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, claiming
that the state statutes that excluded disabled children from the public schools
were unconstitutional.51 Similarly, Mills v. Board of Education was another class
action suit in which seven parents sought to enjoin the District of Columbia from
excluding their children from the public schools.52 The parents claimed that their
44

Trent, supra note 43, at 27, 94.

Dr. Thomas Kirkbride, was an influential figure in establishing the state-sponsored mental
institutions during the nineteenth century. Although Kirkbride was not alone in this endeavor, he
was the most influential. In particular, Kirkbride is representative of the “moral treatment” era.
This era supported the creation of state mental institutions and justified society’s perceived need to
confine the mentally ill. See Nancy Tomes, A Generous Confidence: Thomas Story Kirkbride
and the Art of Asylum-Keeping 89, 1840–83 (1984).
45

46
The history of mental institutions and institutional schools is beyond the scope of this
comment; however, it is important to think of the passage of IDEA within the historical framework.
States funded the first mental institutions under the theory of “moral treatment,” which eventually
gave way to the theory of eugenics and custodial treatment. For more information see HenriJacques Stiker, A History of Disability (William Sayers trans.,1997) (discussing society’s innate
desire to achieve “sameness” or “identicalness,” and society’s continuous struggle with this desire);
see also Trent, supra note 43 (discussing how political and social opinions created the label of
“disabled” and fostered a segregated state school system).
47
Nielsen, supra note 40, at 20 (challenging American history discourse to include how ideas
of ableism are prevalent).

Trent, supra note 43, at 1 (showing an increased awareness of what institutional schools
were like for children by evidencing that the Chicago Sun-Times received a Pulitzer Prize in 1971
for powerfully disturbing photos of the Lincoln and Dixon schools in Illinois).
48

49
Cynthia L. Kelly, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act—The Right “Idea” for All
Childrens’ Education, 75 J. Kan. Bus. Ass’n 24, 25 (2006).

See Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (D.
Pa. 1972); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972).
50

51

Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. at 282–84.

52

Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 868.
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children’s exclusion from the public schools was a violation of their due process
rights.53 Both PARC and Mills resulted in settlement agreements that recognized
a state’s obligation to provide public education to disabled children and to ensure
parental participation in developing the child’s educational plan.54
These cases, predicated upon allowing mentally disabled students access to
public education, provided the impetus for federal legislation.55 Although states
had monetary and resource concerns, they joined the movement and looked
to Congress to “provide consistency in education programming and subsidize
the costs of providing special education.”56 Accordingly, Congress passed the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) in 1975.57 The EAHCA
provided money to states that complied with the EAHCA in order to ensure
that children with disabilities would gain access to public education.58 Prior to
the passage of the EAHCA, public schools excluded approximately 1.75 million
school-age children with disabilities and another 2.2 million did not have programs
that met their needs.59 Based upon these statistics and the legacy of institutional
education, Congress’s intent with the passage of the EAHCA was to grant access
to public education as a baseline guarantee.60 As the EAHCA underwent changes,
the amendments to the Act created more in-depth requirements that shifted the
focus of EAHCA from that of access to the success of disabled students.61

53

Id.

54

See Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. at 302.

55

Kelly, supra note 49, at 25.

Kelly, supra note 49, at 25; see, e.g., Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875; Note, Enforcing the Right
to an “Appropriate” Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 Harv.
L. Rev. 1103, 1105 (1979) (“Congress authorized large annual appropriations to aid the states in
providing expensive new services for the handicapped.”).
56

57

See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2015).

See Therese Craparo, Note, Remembering the “Individuals” of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 6 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 467, 468 (2002-2003).
58

59
60

See Mark Weber, Special Education Law and Litigation Treatise 1:1–1:2 (2002).
The Rowley decision states:
The Act’s legislative history shows that Congress sought to make public education
available to handicapped children, but did not intend to impose upon the States
any great substantive education standard than is necessary to make such access
to public education meaningful. The Act’s intent was more to open the door of
public education to handicapped children by means of specialized educational
services than to guarantee any particular substantive level of education once inside.

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 177 (1982). However, given the historical context it is hardly
surprising that the focus was on access; yet, despite this focus, there was a sentiment to go even
further than just offering access. See Mark C. Weber, Common-Law Interpretation of Appropriate
Education: The Road Not Taken in Rowley, 41 J.L. & Educ. 95, 110–11 (2012); see also infra Part III.
61

See infra Part II.B.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2016

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 16 [2016], No. 1, Art. 8

230

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 16

B. From the EAHCA to IDEA
Not only did the EAHCA provide states with a monetary incentive, it also
guaranteed “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to all disabled children.62
In 1990, Congress reauthorized the EAHCA and although the reauthorization
did not drastically alter the substance of the Act or its guarantee of FAPE,
Congress renamed the EAHCA to the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).63 The most drastic changes and amendments to IDEA came in 1997
and 2004.64
In 1997, Congress enacted the most extensive amendments to IDEA.65
The 1997 amendments attempted to shift the legislation’s focus from mere
public school access towards improving a child’s educational achievement and
performance.66 Specific changes included strengthening the role of parents in
decision-making, encouraging the use of mediation for dispute resolution,
including measures to avoid mislabeling students, and codifying comprehensive
disciplinary procedures.67 Congress noted that the amendments aligned the
statute with the national standard “of ensuring equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living and economic self-sufficiency for individuals
with disabilities.”68 In 2004, Congress once again amended IDEA.69

1. No Child Left Behind Act and IDEA
In response to the enactment of NCLB, which Congress passed in 2001,
the 2004 amendments to IDEA attempted to reflect the initiatives outlined in
NCLB.70 NCLB imposed new educational accountability procedures, such as
holding states accountable for students’ performance on state-based tests.71 The
2004 amendments aligned with NCLB’s accountability policies by requiring
proficiency in reading, math, and science for all disabled students.72 Thus, these
See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, §§ 3(a),
601(c), 89 Stat. 773, 774–75 (1991) (introducing FAPE into education law). The guarantee of
FAPE is under Part B of the EAHCA. Part B discusses funding and requirements for public schools
to offer education to disabled children. Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 49, at 25.
62

63

See Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 587 (1991).

64

Kelly, supra note 49, at 26.

65

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1997).

66

Kelly, supra note 49, at 26.

67

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1997).

68

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).

69

Kelly, supra note 49, at 26.

70

Kelly, supra note 49, at 26.

71

See 20 U.S.C. § 6301(6) (2002); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2010).

Dixie Snow Huefner, Updating the FAPE Standard Under IDEA, 37 J.L. & Educ. 367,
372 (2008).
72
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amendments shifted IDEA’s focus from bureaucratic compliance with procedures
to student outcomes and student achievement.73
When Congress passed NCLB with bipartisan approval, it marked a major
shift in educational policy.74 While IDEA serves as the federal legislation that
creates standards for the education of disabled children, NCLB provides
states with standards for students in the regular classroom of public schools.75
NCLB holds states accountable by using state tests, based on a state’s general
curriculum, to measure student performance.76 Additionally, public schools must
provide “adequate yearly progress” reports under NCLB.77 These reports must
measure the schools’ progress in achieving academic assessments and providing
“continuous and substantial academic improvement for all students.”78 As a
method of holding schools accountable for student progress, NCLB also requires
states to create incentives for schools to demonstrate a higher percentage of
student improvement.79
NCLB also requires public schools to demonstrate that students with
disabilities have substantial improvement.80 Thus, NCLB is supposed to have
wide reaching impact on every student in a school district.81 In particular, one
of the purposes of NCLB is to “[close] the achievement gap between high-and
low-performing children, minority and nonminority students, and between
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers.”82 Specifically, NCLB
lists children with disabilities as a particular group upon which schools should
focus.83 The purpose of NCLB is to “[help] every child reach his or her academic
potential and [aid] each child to self-actualize into smart and effective adults no
matter how disadvantaged . . . .”84 Therefore, NCLB encourages a heightened
73

See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(15)(2005); Kelly, supra note 49, at 26.

See Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Enough is No Longer Good
Enough: How the High Stake Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act Supplanted the Rowley Definition
of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L. & Educ. 5, 20 (2012).
74

75
See id. at 16 (“Unlike IDEA, which was a civil rights bill, NCLB created new conditions
for federal funding for public schools. While IDEA confers the right to a [F]APE to children with
disabilities, NCLB enumerates standards for schools and ties state educational funding to stringent
academic results.”).
76

See 20 U.S.C. § 6301(6).

77

See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2) (2006).

78

20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(iii) (emphasis added).

See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(A)(iii). Incentives are generally in the form of sanctions
or rewards.
79

80

See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II)(cc).

81

See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(iii); Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 74, at 16.

82

See 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3).

83

See 20 U.S.C. § 6301(2).

84

Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 74, at 16.
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standard for every student in the education system. Creating such standards
for the regular classrooms has the potential to impact the definition of FAPE.85
However, a majority of courts continue to view NCLB separately from IDEA.86

2. Components of IDEA
IDEA has various procedural safeguards that provide protection for students
and their parents.87 For example, IDEA requires schools to ensure parent
involvement in making decisions for the child.88 In particular, parent involvement
occurs through prior written notice and the creation of Individual Education
Programs (IEPs).89 Prior written notice to the parent is required whenever the
school proposes or refuses to initiate or change “the identification, evaluation, or
education placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public
education to the child.”90 The prior written notice must contain a description
of the proposed or refused action and an explanation of why the school has
made that decision.91 Ultimately, these notice requirements provide parents with
information necessary to effectively engage in planning their child’s education.92
Additionally, each child in special education must have a written IEP.93 Each
IEP contains the following information: a statement regarding the student’s
present academic and functional abilities, a statement of the student’s measurable
annual goals, a statement of the student’s academic and functional goals, a
description of how to measure progress towards those goals, a statement detailing
the related services and supplementary aids the student requires, an explanation

85
Robin Bucaria, Expanding the Definition of FAPE Under NCLB: Why Courts Give FAPE
the Slip and Leave It Swimming in a Sea of Alphabet Soup 10 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 237, 245 (stating:
“NCLB could modify the provision of a FAPE under IDEA in several ways.”). See infra Part II.D.
86
See infra Part II.C. The effectiveness of NCLB is outside the scope of this comment. Rather,
NCLB is used in this framework to understand the impact upon IDEA. Imposing standards on the
regular public classroom and the effect that will have on FAPE.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2005) (detailing the required procedures for schools, including
but not limited to the ability of the parents to examine all of the child’s records, medication, written
prior notice, planning of IEPs, and the opportunity to present a complaint).
87

See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(B) (2010) (“education of children with disabilities can be
made more effective by—(B) strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that
families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their
children at school and at home . . . .”).
88

89

Kelly, supra note 49, at 28–9.

90

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).

91

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (c)(1).

Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, Special Education and the Law: A Guide
Practitioners 98 (2014) (“The IDEA’s notice requirements are designed to provide parents
with the information necessary to allow them to participate actively in the educational planning
process for their children.”).
92

for

93

See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2005).
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of the amount of time the student will spend in the regular classroom, and various
other explanations and statements relating to the student’s educational plan.94
IDEA requires an IEP team to create the child’s IEP and this team must meet at
least once per year.95
IDEA also provides that all children with disabilities will receive Free
Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment
(LRE).96 In particular, IDEA defines FAPE as:
special education and related services that[:] (A) have been
provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the
State educational agency, (C) include appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved,
and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program . . . .97
Specifically, special education is educational instruction for handicapped children
that is designed to meet the unique needs of the child’s disability at no cost to
the parents.98 Related services include “transportation, and such developmental,
corrective, and other supportive services . . . as may be [required] to assist a
child with disability to benefit from special education.”99 Although IDEA
provides this definition of FAPE, it is vague when determining a standard of
“appropriateness.”100 Some scholars believe Congress intentionally left the term
open for courts to interpret.101

94

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).

20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B), (d)(4)(A)(i). The team consists of the child’s parents, at least
one regular education teacher and one special education teacher, a representative of the school, and
any other individuals the parents would like to include who have particular expertise or knowledge
of the child’s needs.
95

96
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2005). LRE in IDEA refers to the instruction of disabled
children in regular classrooms to the “maximum extent appropriate.” Because FAPE and LRE are
interrelated in IDEA, LRE is often associated with FAPE. See Craparo, supra note 58, at 469.
97

See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2010).

20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (special education includes physical education as well as instruction
conducted “in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings . . . .”).
98

99

See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26).

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188–89 (1982) (“[n]oticeably absent from the
language of the statue is any substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded
handicapped children.”); see Weber, supra note 60, at 101 (“[a]lthough special educators used the
words ‘appropriate education’ before passage of the Act, there appears to have been no clear or
uniform meaning given to the term when they did so.”).
100

101

See Weber, supra note 60, at 107.
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C. Majority Interpretation of FAPE
Board of Education v. Rowley is the prevailing United States Supreme Court
case concerning what constitutes FAPE.102 Since Amy Rowley had minimal
residual hearing, the school prepared an IEP for her.103 The IEP stated that Amy
would remain in the regular classroom, continue using an FM hearing aid, and
receive instruction from a tutor one hour each day.104 However, Amy’s parents
disagreed with the IEP because they believed she also needed to have a sign
language interpreter in the classroom.105 Amy’s parents argued that the school’s
refusal to have a sign-language interpreter denied their daughter’s guarantee of
an “appropriate” education because Amy understood fewer words without the
interpreter.106 The district court held that Amy was not receiving FAPE and
the court defined the standard “appropriate” to require “that each handicapped
child be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with
the opportunity provided to other children.”107 The appellate court affirmed the
district court.108
On appeal, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court based on
an alternative interpretation of FAPE.109 The Court determined that Congress’s
intent when passing the EAHCA was not to maximize the opportunity of success
for each individual child nor did it require anything more than equal access.110
According to the Court, FAPE only requires that the school provide the child
with access to public education that “confer[s] some educational benefit upon the
handicapped child.”111 Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented and found
that the legislative history of the EAHCA provided a different interpretation which
“supports the conclusion that [the EAHCA] intends to give handicapped children
an educational opportunity commensurate with that given other children.”112
While the dissent argued FAPE was a means to “eliminate the effects of the
handicap, at least to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity
to learn,” the majority indicated that the “basic floor of opportunity” standard

102

See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184–85; see also Weber, supra note 60, at 95.

103

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Id. at 185.

Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff ’d, 632 F.2d 945, 948
(2d Cir. 1980), rev’d, 458 U.S. 176, 210 (1982).
107

108

Rowley, 632 F.2d at 948.

109

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 210.

110

Id. at 196–97.

111

Id. at 200–01 (emphasis added).

112

Id. at 212, 214 (White, J., dissenting).
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meant disabled children were only guaranteed access to public education.113 Thus,
the Rowley Court developed the “basic floor of opportunity” or the “some benefit”
standard of FAPE.114
Even though Congress adopted amendments to IDEA in 1997 and 2004, in
an attempt to shift IDEA’s focus to student progress, Rowley remains the authority
defining FAPE.115 By interpreting the requirements of FAPE in 1982, the Rowley
Court restricted the development of other FAPE standards in the lower courts.116
Consequently, lower courts have hesitated to adopt alternative standards of FAPE
based upon proportional maximization or equal opportunity.117
One case that indicates Rowley is still the controlling precedent, despite
legislative changes to IDEA, is Lt. T.B. v. Warwick School Committee.118 In
Warwick, the parents of an autistic child challenged the adequacy of their child’s
IEP.119 In particular, the parents argued that the 1997 amendments to IDEA
“changed [the ‘some benefit’ standard of Rowley] to require school districts to
provide the ‘maximum benefit’ to special needs children.”120 The parents argued
that the amendments required teachers to be qualified to prepare special education
students to “lead productive, independent, adult lives, to the maximum extent
possible.”121 Yet, the court held that the 1997 amendments did not increase the
standard beyond the “basic floor of opportunity” standard.122
In Kirby v. Cabell County Board of Education, the court reached a similar
conclusion regarding the 2004 amendments.123 In Kirby, the parents of a child
Id. at 200 (majority opinion) (“neither the Act nor its history persuasively demonstrates that Congress thought that equal protection required anything more than equal access.”
(emphasis added)).
113

Id. at 201. See Maureen A. MacFarlane, The Shifting Floor of Educational Opportunity:
The Impact of Educational Reform on Rowley, 41 J.L. & Educ. 45, 45–8 (2012) (arguing that the
‘basic floor of opportunity’ or ‘some benefit’ standard is still good law); Weber, supra note 60, at
95–96 (stating that although there may be some competing definitions of “appropriate” in other
circuits, the ‘basic floor of opportunity’ or ‘some benefit’ standard remains the widely accepted
meaning of “appropriate”).
114

115

See MacFarlane, supra note 114, at 46–47.

116

See Weber, supra note 60, at 100.

117

See Weber, supra note 60, at 119.

118

Lt. T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2004).

119

Id. at 81.

120

Id. at 83.

121

Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(E) (2010)).

Id. at 83 (holding that the 1997 amendments did not increase the standard of “basic floor
of opportunity,” found in Rowley, to the policy of “maximum benefit”); see LaBrosse, supra note 13,
at 97–98 (discussing how a majority of courts continue to apply the Rowley standard).
122

Kirby v. Cabell Cty. Bd. of Educ., 2006 WL 2691435, at *1–11, *6–8 (S.D. W. Va. Sept.
19, 2006).
123
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with Asperger’s Syndrome alleged that the school did not provide an IEP that
sufficiently provided “appropriate” education.124 The parents argued that NCLB,
as well as the 2004 amendments to IDEA, obligated schools to provide a
higher level of educational benefit.125 However, the court held that the language
in NCLB did not create any obligations that schools must adhere to in their
special education programs.126 Additionally, the court stated that IDEA “does not
require providing every available service necessary to maximize a disabled child’s
potential.”127 Rather, IDEA ensures access to education and that disabled children
will have the opportunity to interact with other children in the school.128
Even without parents raising the arguments regarding amendments to
IDEA and NCLB, a majority of circuit courts continue to apply Rowley’s “some
benefit” standard.129 For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Sytsema v. Academy School District No. 20 held that the school
district only needed to provide a student with some benefit.130 In Sytsema, the
school developed an IEP for Nicholas Sytsema, an autistic student, in which
the school broke-down the number of hours that he would receive independent
instruction and how much time he would spend in the regular classroom.131
Nicholas’s parents rejected the IEP, noting that Nicholas did not do well in an
integrated classroom.132 Instead, Nicholas’s parents enrolled him in a private
school.133 Seeking tuition reimbursement, Nicholas’s parents argued the district
denied him FAPE.134 However, the court rejected the parents’ argument that the
integrated classroom method was ineffective for Nicholas, resulting in denying
him FAPE.135 In particular, the court noted that under Nicholas’s IEP, he would

124

Id. at *2, *6–8.

125

Id. at *6.

126

Id.

127

Id. at *2.

Id. (citing Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (stating IDEA
“intends that the disabled child will receive an education, where possible, in public schools and by
participating as much as possible in the same activities as nondisabled children.”)).
128

129
Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley
Has Been Interpreted, 247 Ed. Law Rep. 1, 6 –17 (2009) (providing a circuit-by-circuit analysis of
interpretations of FAPE and detailing that the D.C. Circuit, First Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Seventh
Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit apply the “some benefit” standard
of FAPE).

Sytsema ex rel. Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis added) (holding that under the Rowley standard the district only needed to provide
Nicholas with some benefit).
130

131

Id. at 1309–10.

132

Id. at 1310.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id. at 1317.
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be exposed to various teaching methods which “would have provided Nicholas
with some educational benefit.”136 Although Sytsema was decided in 2008, the
court continued to rely upon Rowley’s interpretation of FAPE and did not impose
a higher standard of appropriate education.137
Thus, despite the 1997 and the 2004 amendments, as well as NCLB,
courts continue to apply Rowley’s concept of access as the standard required for
“appropriate” education.138 Some courts have even argued that Congress’s failure
to change the statute’s language regarding “appropriate” education demonstrates
Congress’s ratification of the access standard.139 However, inconsistencies in the
circuit courts suggest that the interpretation of FAPE remains unclear.140

D. Minority Interpretation of FAPE
Despite the fact that a majority of circuit courts apply the “some benefit”
standard of Rowley, there are a minority of courts that determined IDEA
requires schools to provide educational access that is more than de minimus. This
is typically referred to as the “meaningful benefit” standard.141 Polk v. Central
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16 is the leading authority on requiring schools to
ensure special educational students receive more than de minimus education and
show “tangible gain in abilities.”142 In Polk, Christopher was eligible for special

136

Id. (emphasis added).

Id. The Tenth Circuit has adopted the “some benefit” standard in three major cases decided
after the 1997 and 2004 amendments. See id.; O’Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No.
233, 144 F.3d 692, 699– 01 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the parents’ argument that Kansas state law
imposed a higher standard of FAPE and holding that the court must only determine whether a child
received some educational benefit); Thompson R2–J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d
1143, 1154 (2008) (stating “the legal principle outlined there by the Supreme Court [in Rowley]
controls equally here: a school district is not required to provide every service that would benefit
a student if it has a formula that can reasonably be expected to generate some progress on that
student’s IEP goals.”).
137

138
See, e.g., Sch. Bd. v. M.M., No. 2:05-CV-5-FtM-29SPC, 1–15, 8–13 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27,
2007) (holding that plaintiff ’s argument contending NCLB created a higher standard requiring a
school to maximize their child’s potential was rejected and the court reiterated the Rowley standard
of “a basic floor of opportunity”); Leighty ex rel. Leighty v. Laurel Sch. Dist., 457 F. Supp. 2d 546,
562 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (rejecting the application of NCLB to increase the level of education provided
to special education students).
139
See J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 2010); Mr. C. v. Maine
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, 538 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300–01 (D. Me. 2008); Weber, supra note 60,
at 116.
140

Weber, supra note 60, at 116.

N.B. v. Hellgate Element. Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008); Ridgewood
Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999); J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist.,
No. C06-494P, 2006 WL 3628033, at *1–9, *3–4 (W.D. Was. Dec. 8, 2006). See supra Part II.D.
141

Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermed. Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988); see Decision
C-0122-1, supra note 9.
142
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educational services because he was severely developmentally disabled.143 As part
of his special education, Christopher was entitled to receive related services.144
Christopher’s parents believed that his education benefited from receiving direct
physical therapy from a licensed physical therapist.145 The school district remained
unwilling to provide Christopher with direct physical therapy even though it aided
him in school.146 Instead, the school district only allowed a physical therapist
to consult the teachers on how to provide physical therapy.147 Christopher’s
parents argued that the school district did not individually tailor Christopher’s
education as required by law.148 The district court relied on Rowley and held that
Christopher had received some benefit from his education; as such, the school
district had met its requirements.149
On appeal, the circuit court reversed the decision of the district court and
held that the school district must provide an education that is more than de
minimus.150 Ultimately, the circuit court held that there is not a blanket standard
that is applicable to every student, but rather it “must be gauged in relation to the
child’s potential.”151 The school district therefore must consider the individual
student’s capabilities in determining what education is appropriate for him or
her.152 Considering the capabilities and needs of Christopher individually,
the court found that he was entitled to direct physical therapy as part of his
appropriate education.153
Similarly, in Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., M.E. was
eligible for special education services and was held back in first grade because
the school determined his skills were inferior to his classmates’.154 Since M.E.
struggled to improve in school, his parents sought an independent evaluation.155
The evaluation concluded that M.E.’s intelligence was in the ninety-fifth
percentile and his reading skills were in the second percentile.156 Consequently,

143

Polk, 853 F.2d at 173.

144

Id.

145

Id. at 174.

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id. at 175.

150

Id. at 184–85.

151

Id. at 185.

152

Id.

153

Id.

154

Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 1999).

155

Id. at 243.

156

Id.
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M.E.’s parents took him out of the public school system and placed him in a
private school.157 Seeking reimbursement for the tuition of the private school,
M.E.’s parents brought legal action against the school district for denying M.E.
FAPE under the 1997 IDEA.158
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that IDEA imposed a higher standard than a “trivial educational benefit.”159 In
particular, the court noted that Rowley rejects “a bright-line rule on the amount
of benefit required of an appropriate IEP in favor of an approach requiring a
student-by-student analysis that carefully considers the student’s individual
abilities.”160 The court held that there should be more focus upon the student’s
capabilities as opposed to focusing upon the contents of the IEP.161
Although the “meaningful education benefit” standard encourages courts to
look at each child individually and determine their capabilities, some scholars
and attorneys question the impact of this standard.162 Minority courts have yet
to draw a distinction between the “meaningful education benefit” and Rowley’s
“some benefit” standard. Commenting upon the ambiguity and the inconsistency
of the two standards, Judge Samuel P. King questioned the differences in Blake
v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii.163 Judge King noted that “[v]arious
opinions have left it ambiguous as to what the precise difference, if any, is
between ‘meaningful’ benefit and ‘some’ benefit.”164 Despite these inconsistencies,
the “meaningful benefit” standard is still used by a minority of jurisdictions
including Wyoming.165
Wyoming Statute section 21-2-501 states that “[e]very child of school age
in the state of Wyoming having a mental, physical or psychological disability
which impairs learning, shall be entitled to and shall receive a free and appropriate
education in accordance with his capabilities.”166 Chapter Seven of the Wyoming

157

Id. at 244–45.

158

Id. at 245.

159

Id. at 247.

160

Id.

LaBrosse, supra note 13, at 100; see, e.g., Dennis Fan, No Idea What the Future Holds: The
Retrospective Evidence Dilemma, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1503, 1505 (stating “federal courts should
treat ‘retrospective evidence’ in deciding whether the IEP is substantively adequate.”). Retrospective
evidence is evidence that is beyond the four corners of the IEP, including evidence of the child’s
success and failure in the classroom. Id. at 1503.
161

162

See Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 74, at 20–21; Wenkart, supra note 129, at 29.

163

Blake C. ex rel. Tina F. v. Dep’t of Educ., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Haw. 2009).

164

Id. at 1206–07.

165

See infra notes 166–78 and accompanying text.

166

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-501 (2015).
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Education Rules, promulgated by the WDE, also discusses FAPE; however, the
rule remains vague.167 The rule states:
School districts and public agencies shall ensure that a Free
Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) is available to all children
with disabilities residing in Wyoming no later than the child’s
third (3rd) birthday through the completion of the school year
the child turns twenty-one (21), including those children who
have been suspended or expelled from school.168
In interpreting FAPE, Wyoming cases primarily deal with the age limit for
students to remain in the program.169 However, Wyoming does publish final
complaint decisions.170 These complaint decisions stem from IDEA’s dispute
resolution mechanisms for parents, which allow for resolution of their concerns
outside the courts.171 After a parent submits a complaint to the WDE, mediation
may occur between the parents and the school, or a hearing officer may be
appointed to hear both parties and make a decision.172
The Wyoming complaint decisions reveal that Wyoming inconsistently uses
the “some benefit” standard and the “meaningful benefit” standard.173 For instance
Wyoming complaint decision C-0122-11 cites Thompson RJ-2 School District v.
Luke P. and states that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
“reiterated that a school district is providing a student with appropriate special
education program if the services are reasonably calculated to allow the student
to make ‘some progress’ in the IEP.”174 However, the complaint additionally cites
Polk and states that IDEA requires more than a trivial educational benefit.175
Similarly, in Wyoming complaint decisions C-0175-11 and C-0176-11
the WDE concluded that “a child’s education benefit must be more than de

167

cation
168

See Chapter 7 Services For Children with Disabilities, Wyoming Department of Edu
§ 5(a)(i) (2010), http://soswy.state.wy.us/Rules/RULES/7767.pdf.
Id.

See, e.g., Natrona Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019, 1035 (Wyo. 1988) (holding
the State Board of Education’s rule that provided education until age twenty-two invalid because
state law only requires the local school district to provide education to handicapped students
between the ages of five and twenty-one); Natrona Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d
1039, 1050–53 (Wyo. 1988); State v. Cochran, 764 P.2d 1037 (Wyo. 1988).
169

170

See WDE, supra note 2.

171

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2005).

172

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415.

173

See Decision C-0122-1, supra note 9.

174

See Decision C-0122-1, supra note 9, at 16.

175

See Decision C-0122-1, supra note 9, at 16.
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minimus—there must be some tangible gain in abilities.”176 In a subsequent
paragraph, the complaint states that “[i]t is the obligation of the [school] [d]istrict
to provide special education and related services reasonably calculated to result
in some educational benefit as measured by progress toward IEP goals, or to take
steps to address the lack of progress.”177 Therefore, while Wyoming acknowledges
the heightened meaningful education benefit, the WDE has tempered it by
holding that school districts “are not required to maximize a student’s educational
performance.”178 Additionally, the WDE further complicates the interpretation
of FAPE by relying upon both the Rowley “some benefit” standard and the
“meaningful benefit” standard.179

E. Alternative Approaches
With the inconsistencies both in the courts and at the state level regarding
FAPE, scholar Maureen MacFarlane provides two potential options: individual
states should embrace a higher standard, or Congress should expressly amend or
reject the Rowley standard.180
Michigan, for example, adopted a state mandate with a heightened standard
of FAPE.181 The mandate reads, “[t]he board of a local school district shall provide
special education programs and services designed to develop the maximum
potential of every handicapped person.”182 Although this maximum potential
standard in Michigan does not require the best education possible, Michigan
adopted a higher standard than required at the federal level.183 However,
Michigan has yet to define what “maximum potential” requires in the context
of IDEA.184 Despite not having a clear definition of how the standard differs

176
Wyoming Department of Education, Complaint Decision and Order for Corrective Action
C-0175-11 and C-0176-11 14 (Jan. 6, 2011), http://edu.wyoming.gov/downloads/special-ed//
SpecEd_Complaint_C-0175-11_and_C-0176-11_Redacted_Decision.pdf (citation omitted)
[hereinafter Decision C-0175-11 and C-0176-11].
177

Decision C-0175-11 and C-0176-11, supra note 176, at 15 (emphasis added).

178

Decision C-0122-1, supra note 9, at 16 (citation omitted).

179

See Decision C-0122-1, supra note 9; Decision C-0175-11 and C-0176-11, supra note 176.

180

MacFarlane, supra note 114, at 59.

Gary L. Monserud, Comment, The Quest for a Meaningful Mandate for the Education of
Children with Disabilities, 18 J. C.R. & Econ. Dev. 675, 833–34 (2004).
181

182

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1751(1) (2015).

Dick-Friedman ex rel. Friedman v. Bd. of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (“The substantive requirement of the IDEA . . . incorporates Michigan’s higher standard
requiring that the IEP be designed to ‘develop the maximum potential’ of the child.” (citation
omitted)); Renner v. Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 635, 645 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Michigan has chosen
to enhance IDEA’s requirements . . . it does not necessarily require the best education possible.”
(citation omitted)).
183

184

Renner, 185 F.3d at 645.
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from federal legislation, the continued application of the heightened standard
remains important.185

III. Analysis
Whether states adopt the “meaningful benefit” standard espoused by a
minority of courts or adopt a higher standard of FAPE, states need to specifically
distinguish the standard from the Rowley standard. Without defining these
higher standards explicitly, the impact of the standards, like the “meaningful
benefit” standard, is lessened because there is no distinction between the
heightened standard and the Rowley “some benefit” standard.186 While Wyoming
acknowledges the “meaningful benefit” standard, in practice, this standard does
little to expand the opportunities provided to special education students.187 Since
neither the Court nor Congress has expressly rejected the Rowley “some benefit”
standard, the risk is that the “meaningful benefit” standard cannot stand on its
own, nor can any other heightened standard.188
Even with slightly higher standards, courts continue to look to Rowley for
guidance and ultimately fail to interpret a greater obligation to students with
disabilities.189 The result is that the higher standards have no chance of creating
an impact or change when defining FAPE. The Rowley standard restricts courts
to a narrow application despite the 1997 and 2004 amendments to IDEA and the
implementation of NCLB.190 Although a direct congressional rejection of Rowley
would be effective, Wyoming should take steps towards reframing FAPE to align
with IDEA’s amendments and NCLB.191 Thus, Wyoming should amend its
statutes in order to clearly define FAPE in the context of the IDEA amendments
and NCLB.

A. Wyoming Should Adopt a Heightened Standard
The Wyoming State Legislature and the WDE should re-evaluate the standard
of “appropriate” education for all disabled children in light of the heightened
standards developed by NCLB and the amendments to IDEA. This does not
mean that students in special education programs should receive superior services
than those offered to other students.192 Rather, NCLB requires all students
185

See Monserud, supra note 181, at 834.

186

See supra notes 166–78 and accompanying text; see also Wenkart, supra note 129, at 29.

187

See supra Part II.D; Wenkart, supra note 129, at 29; Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 74, at

20–21.
188

See supra Part II.C.

189

See supra Part II.C.

190

See supra Part II.C.

191

See supra Part II.D.

192

See Weber, supra note 60, at 103–04.
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in a school district, no matter their background, to achieve a certain level of
proficiency.193 NCLB also requires Wyoming to have academic standards that
challenge all students in academic subjects and achievement.194 If all students
are to achieve these standards, the standards should extend to special education
students as well.195
As discussed earlier, NCLB also requires Wyoming to show students with
disabilities have made substantial improvement.196 Thus, NCLB should have a
wide-reaching impact on every student in a school district. Although the specific
accountability requirements of NCLB have not always been popular in Wyoming,
the goal of improving student education is indisputable.197
Developing a standard of education that encompasses disabled children
and their peers is not without challenges.198 It is difficult to determine whether
a student is receiving an education comparable to other students in the regular
classroom; however this difficulty should not be a deterrent in achieving this
standard.199 Quality of education can be determined in various ways including:
“qualification of teachers, depth and innovativeness of teaching technique, research
support behind the curriculum, consistency in the application of professional
best practices, conformity to state rules, responsiveness of the administration, and
other indicators.”200 This approach would also require schools and Wyoming to
undergo changes. For instance, schools would need stricter standards for special
education students, teachers would need to be willing to dedicate more time to
individual students, and schools would need to make sure that special education
teachers and paraprofessionals have qualified experience. In contrast, Wyoming
would need to navigate the transition by taking into consideration the concerns
of all of those involved, including parents, educators, and school districts. These
changes will not occur over a short period of time, but this approach will have
positive impacts on schools and disabled students.
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Considering NCLB in conjunction with the amendments to IDEA furthers
the argument that federal legislation, as it is written, requires a heightened
standard of FAPE.201 The 2004 amendments to IDEA aligned IDEA more closely
to NCLB.202 After 2004, similar to NCLB, IDEA required teachers to be “highly
qualified” and special education assessments came under the accountability
provisions of NCLB.203 With these changes to IDEA, federal legislation focused
more on a disabled student’s results and achievements as opposed to bureaucratic
compliance.204 Since the original special education law of EAHCA, there have
been dramatic changes in the political context of the United States as well as in
IDEA itself.205
With the enactment of EAHCA in 1975, access to public education for
disabled children was the primary concern because school districts actively
excluded disabled children from the education system.206 Thirty plus years after
Rowley, disabled children are not denied access to a public education, but rather
the concern is with the quality of education that disabled children receive in the
classroom. IDEA has not remained stagnant over these years, both the 1997 and
the 2004 amendments attempted to shift the focus of the act to a more quality
based standard.207 Yet, the courts continue to look to Rowley for guidance and fail
to interpret a greater obligation to students with disabilities despite advancements
in understanding disabilities as well as the amendments to IDEA and the
enactment of NCLB.208 The definition of FAPE should reflect these changes and
greater understandings.
As Justice Rehnquist stated in Rowley, the original intent of EAHCA
“was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on
appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once
inside.”209 Although that may have been the original intent of EAHCA, public
schools are well beyond this consideration.210 In the immediate aftermath of
deinstitutionalization, a law focused on “some educational benefit” was an
improvement for children. However, today the political context is very different.
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, the NCLB
in 2004 which addresses the education of every child, and the amendments
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to IDEA.211 All of these acts exemplify how far the United States has come in
recognizing the basic rights of individuals with disabilities. The issue is no longer
whether a disabled child has access to a public education, but rather whether the
U.S. and the individual states are prepared to take the next step to ensure quality
education for special education students, requiring more than just “some benefit.”
A starting point for change is for Wyoming to adopt its own definition of
FAPE because the current court interpretation is insufficient. Wyoming complaint
decisions reveal some of the practical problems of FAPE. Hearing officers who
oversee complaint decisions use two standards to determine if a school district
has denied a special education student FAPE.212 While simultaneously applying
the “some benefit” standard of Rowley and the “meaningful benefit” standard of
Polk, the WDE has convoluted the definition of FAPE.213 This confusion has
made the interpretation of FAPE uncertain. On the one hand, the uncertainty of
what FAPE requires denies parents the ability to know which standard Wyoming
follows. Thus, parents who are frustrated with the system assume schools ought
to do more.214 Additionally, schools do not know how to provide FAPE to each
individual student and what constitutes a denial of FAPE. When neither party
understands the requirements of FAPE, the chance of an amicable relationship is
significantly decreased.
This uncertainty frustrates the complaint process for parents and causes
hostility between parents and schools. A hearing officer—without specific
guidance from the state—may implement either the “some benefit” or “meaningful
benefit” standard.215 Thus, submitting a complaint to the WDE is risky.
Parents might submit a complaint believing that the school has denied their
child of FAPE, but without knowing the FAPE standard parents will not know
what the WDE will conclude. Without any certainty as to the interpretation of
FAPE, parents might be deterred from utilizing the complaint process.
Unfortunately, those who suffer the most from these inconsistencies are the
special education students.
The Wyoming legislature needs to explicitly define FAPE because of the
changing political context, the frustrated system, and the desire for a clear
understanding of FAPE. Moreover, Wyoming needs to provide a definition that
focuses on the success of special education students.
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B. Where to Go from Here
Wyoming has the ability to provide a clear definition of FAPE that better
reflects the intention of IDEA and NCLB. Scholars that encourage a revamp of
FAPE provide several suggestions including higher state standards, IDEA’s express
rejection of Rowley, and higher qualification standards for teachers.216 Scholar,
Martin A. Kotler, suggests that the law should impose a stricter requirement
for schools to disclose information to parents.217 A higher disclosure obligation
may lead to open communication between parents, and help schools and
parents find common ground.218 If parents understood why their child was not
improving, the likelihood for hostility would decrease.219 Scholars, Kaufman and
Blewet, also suggest amending the definition of FAPE in IDEA to effectively
overrule Rowley.220
States have the ability to provide their own standards for FAPE; thus, the
best solution for Wyoming is to amend its definition of FAPE in Wyoming
Statute section 21-2-501. The definition should state that FAPE not only requires
students to have access to public education, but that the students should receive
a meaningful education to the best of the schools’ ability. Similar to NCLB’s
stringent reporting and achievement standards, Wyoming should also incorporate
stringent achievement and reporting standards in special education classrooms.221
To begin, section 21-2-501 should first include language of success. For
example, the statute could say: “A local school district shall provide a meaningful
education to an individual in the special education program. Meaningful
education is defined as an education that encourages the improvement of a child’s
capabilities. Improvement shall be based upon an assessment of the individual
child’s capabilities in accordance to his or her strengths and weaknesses.” This
language suggests one way for Wyoming to achieve a clear and higher standard of
FAPE. Ultimately, the Wyoming legislature should provide a forum for interested
parties to converse. Specifically, Wyoming will need to determine how to hold
schools accountable and how the language of FAPE should emphasize success
over access. This could require schools to hire more qualified special education
teachers, encourage open communication between parents and school districts, or
focus on each individual child’s abilities as opposed to the special education class
as a whole. Defining FAPE to encourage success over access is not a quick and easy
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task that will happen without difficulties. However, in order to provide a better
education to disabled students, Wyoming needs to address these issues.

V. Conclusion
L.J. graduated high school after she turned twenty-one years old.222 Although
she technically graduated from her school, she does not have proficiency in
reading, math, or other core subjects.223 Looking back on her high school
experience, L.J.’s parents believe that if the school was more concerned with
improving L.J.’s skills, her transition into adulthood would have been different.224
Wyoming needs to reconsider its present definition of FAPE because of L.J. and
those students similarly situated. With the enactment of NCLB and the 1997
and 2004 amendments, IDEA has changed its focus from that of access to that
of improvements and results. Moreover, the definition of FAPE should not be
stagnant and remain reliant upon an interpretation from over thirty years ago,
but should better reflect the changes in how the U.S. views disability. Wyoming
can make a difference by taking the lead and defining FAPE in terms of success as
opposed to access.
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